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Rethinking Standing
Gene R. Nichol, Jr.t
We need not mince words when we say that the concept of '"rt. III stand-
ing" has not been defned with complete consistency ....
-Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans
Unitedfor Separation of Church & State, Inc.t
When Justice Rehnquist penned this quotation, he employed no
false sense of modesty. To the contrary, describing the law of standing
merely as less than consistent reflects a talent for understatement not
often associated with the controversial Justice.' In perhaps no other
area of constitutional law has scholarly commentary been so uniformly
critical. Observers, with just cause, regularly accuse the Supreme
Court of applying standing principles in a fashion that is not only er-
ratic, but also eminently frustrating in view of the supposed threshold 4
t Associate Professor of Law, West Virginia University College of Law. B.A. 1973,
Oklahoma State University; J.D. 1976, University of Texas.
1. 454 U.S. 464, 475 (1982).
2. See, e.g., United Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 219-55 (1979) (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting).
3. See, e.g., K. DAvis, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE §§ 22.00-.20 (Supp. 1982); L.
TRIBE, AMERIuc CONSTITUTIONAL LAW §§ 3-17 to -29, 326-70 (1978); J. VININO, LEGAL IDIFN-
TIT': THE COMING OF AGE IN PUBLIC LAW (1978); Albert, Justiciability and Theories ofJudicial
Review A Remote Relationship, 50 S. CAL. L. REV. 1139 (1977); Broderick, The Warth Optional
Standing Doctrine: Return to Judicial Supremacy?, 25 CATIi. U.L. REV. 467 (1976); Chayes, The
Supreme Court, 1981 Term--Foreword" Public Law Litigation and the Burger Court, 96 HARv. L.
REv. 4 (1982); Currie, Misunderstanding Standing, 1981 Sup. CT. REv. 41; Davis, Standing, 1976,
72 Nw. U.L. REv. 69 (1977); LeBel, Standing After Havens Realty: A Critique and an Alternalive
Frameworkfr Analysis, 1982 DUKE L.J. 1013; Monaghan, ConstitutionalAdjudicatton: The Who
and When, 82 YALE L.J. 1363 (1973); Neuborne, The ProceduralAssault on the Warren Legacy." A
Study in Repeal by Indirection, 5 HOFSTRA L. REv. 545, 551-55 (1977); Nichol, Causation as a
Standing Requirement: The Unprinc#led Use of Judicial Restraint, 69 Ky. L.J. 185 (1981) [herein-
after cited as Nichol, Causation]; Nichol, Standing on the Constitution: The Supreme Court and
Valley Forge, 61 N.C.L. Rnv. 798 (1983) [hereinafter cited as Nichol, Standing]; Parker & Stone,
Standing andPublic Law Remedies, 78 COLUM. L. REv. 771 (1978); Scott, Standing in the Supreme
Court-A Functional Analysis, 86 HARv. L. Rav. 645 (1973); Sedler, Standing and the Burger
Court: An Analysis and Some Proposalsfor Legislative Re/orm, 30 RuTGERs L. REv. 863 (1977);
Tushnet, The New Law of Standing: A Pleafor Abandonment, 62 CORNELL L. REv. 663 (1977).
For more charitable reviews, see Brilmayer, The Jurisprudence ofArticle III. Perspectives on
the "Case or Controversy"Requirement, 93 HRv. L. REv. 297 (1979); Leedes, Mr. Justice Powell'r
Standing, 11 RICHMOND L. REv. 269 (1977).
4. In Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498 (1974), the Court characterized the standing issue
as a "threshold question in every federal case." Consider, for example, the frustration of the
litigants in Simon. There the case was litigated to a decision on the merits, and appealed to the
circuit court. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Org. v. Shultz, 370 F. Supp. 325 (D.D.C. 1973), rev'dsub
nom. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Org. v. Simon, 506 F.2d 1278 (D.C. Cir. 1974); see Davis, supra
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nature of the standing inquiry. The judicial eye appears to be peering
beyond preliminary access issues to take into account a variety of inter-
ests traditionally considered irrelevant to the standing determination.
As a result, the Court's existing body of law reflects a state of "intellec-
tual crisis." 5
Nor will the "crisis" soon subside. Current judicial opinions make
little effort to recognize-let alone to ameliorate-the vagaries of the
law of standing. The Court has been more articulate-or at least more
energetic-in describing what it will not do than what it will.6 To an
extent, commentators have followed suit. With a few notable excep-
tions,7 academics have challenged the results in a particular case or line
of cases, without questioning the standing framework as a whole or
offering alternative methods with which to measure judicial power.
The standing principle can no longer appropriately be written off
as merely a "complicated specialty of federal jurisdiction." 8 It has be-
come, rather, a burgeoning, constitutionally grounded doctrine,9 with a
significant impact upon federal litigation. Standing law provides, in
essence, the law of "judicial control of public officers."' 10 Given the
tremendous growth of public law in the United States over the past
three decades, access decisions influence in a major way our constitu-
tional structure. If such decisions are unprincipled, the entire process
of constitutional adjudication suffers.'"
This Article will examine the standing doctrine in its broadest con-
tours. Specifically, in Part I the analytical foundations of the Burger
Court's standing jurisprudence will be criticized. My principal claim is
note 3. In the United States Supreme Court the standing issue was not raised. Yet some four
years after the litigation began, the case was dismissed for failure to meet "threshold" standing
requirements. Simon, 426 U.S. 26, 37 (1976).
5. J. VINING, supra note 3, at 1.
6. Compare, for example, the vigor of Justice Rehnquist's opinion denying standing in Val-
ley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of Church & State, Inc., 454 U.S.
464 (1982), with the belabored analysis set forth in Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Envtl. Study
Group, Inc., 438 U.S. 59 (1978).
7. See J. VINING, supra note 3; Albert, supra note 3; Davis, supra note 3; Scott, supra note 3.
8. United States ex rel. Chapman v. Federal Power Comm'n, 345 U.S. 153, 156 (1953).
9. In Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490 (1975), and Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Org.,
426 U.S. 26 (1976), and their progeny, the Court went out of its way to constitutionalize its stand-
ing rulings.
10. L. JAFFE, JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION 459 (1965).
11. Compare, e.g., Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of
Church & State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464 (1982), with Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 (1968). As simple
standing cases, the comparison would indicate that taxpayers may successfully challenge congres-
sional expenditures designed to benefit religious groups, but not executive determinations to grant
valuable property interests to the same entities. Yet Valley Forge (or Fiast for that matter) serves
to muddy first amendment law as well. It is difficult to avoid the conclusion, having examined the
two cases, that the establishment clause is somehow less enforceable against the executive branch
than the legislative branch. But why?
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that the Court has applied one aspect of standing analysis-namely, the
demand for concrete, particularized injury-to areas of article III in-
vestigation for which the requirement is ill suited. The results of judi-
cial preoccupation with injury in fact have been numerous. First, the
Court has so severely manipulated the injury standard that the founda-
tion of standing law is essentially incomprehensible. Second, by treat-
ing the injury standard as if it were an objective measure of interest, the
Court has refused to initiate a much-needed dialogue on the appropri-
ate boundaries of constitutional harm. Third, the decisions reflect the
influence of issues extraneous to the standing inquiry. The result is a
schizophrenic body of law in which the Court announces that one set of
interests are dispositive (the plaintiff's stake in the litigation), while in
the bulk of the major cases other factors appear to prevail (separation
of powers, federalism concerns, the desirability of the claim on the
merits, etc.). Finally, by dwelling on concrete injury and ignoring the
distinct concerns posed by harms to legally cognizable interests, stand-
ing analysis denigrates less tangible values created by law.
It is my position, therefore, that the Supreme Court should recon-
sider its present use of the particularized injury standard. The demon-
stration of distinct, concrete harm is one appropriate method of
invoking federal jurisdiction. It is not, however, the only manner of
showing legally cognizable interest. Statutory and constitutionally cre-
ated interests often provide independent bases for judicial access. By
* attempting to fit all of standing analysis within the injury rubric, deci-
sions confuse not only what is required to achieve standing but also
what it means to be injured.
A second, and perhaps less controversial claim made here, is that
standing law has been made to serve too many masters. Decisions ex-
amining the plaintiffs interests in the litigation, the breadth of various
protections of substantive law, and the appropriate scope of judicial
authority in our system of government have all passed for standing
analysis. Even with such divergent goals, however, the Court typically
explains its decisions only by conclusory declarations about the pres-
ence or absence of injury. If such factors are to be introduced into the
standing calculus they should be addressed both openly and individu-
ally. To that end, in Part II, I will suggest a method of standing review
designed to segregate the various interests that are brought to bear on
the modem standing decision. I propose that the Court develop dis-
tinctions between (a) access standing-measuring the plaintiff's interest
in the litigation to determine whether he is a proper party to invoke
federal jurisdiction; (b) issue standing-asking whether the plaintiff is a
proper party to assert the particular legal rights he claims; and (c) deci-
sion standing-considering whether the issue to be litigated is a polit-
(Vol. 72:68
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ical one, entrusted to another branch of state or federal government.
So analyzed, it is hoped that scrutiny of the case or controversy require-
ment can be made both more focused and more finely attuned to the
protections afforded by substantive law.
I
PARTICULARIZED INJURY-AN ELUSIVE FOUNDATION
The law of standing is dominated by slogans and litanies. For
over a decade, it appeared mandatory to begin standing decisions with
the Baker v. Carr refrain that the gist of the standing determination is
whether the plaintiff has "alleged such a personal stake in the outcome
of the controversy" 2 as to warrant the invocation of federal jurisdic-
tion. In recent years, however, the shibboleth has become both longer
and more specific. The Supreme Court now regularly indicates that "at
an irreducible minimnum '1 3 the Constitution requires a litigant to show
that he has suffered personally some actual or threatened injury.14 In
addition, the injury must be shown to be fairly traceable to the alleg-
edly illegal conduct of the defendant. 5 As a third, quite distinct,'6 re-
quirement, the injury must be likely to be redressed by a favorable
decision.17 In capsule form, article III imposes requirements of partic-
ularized injury, causation, and redressability.
To complete the picture, it is said that the federal judiciary adheres
to a set of prudential considerations that bear on the question of stand-
ing.' 8 Claimants must, in the usual course, assert their own rights
rather than those of third parties.' 9 The Court will not consider "ab-
12. 369 U.S. 186, 204 (1962). See, eg., City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 103 S. Ct. 1660, 1665
(1983); Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498 (1975); Barlow v. Collins, 397 U.S. 159, 170 (1970)
(Brennan, J., concurring); Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 99 (1968).
13. Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of Church & State,
Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 472 (1982).
14. Gladstone, Realtors v. Village of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91, 99 (1979); Warth v. Seldin, 422
U.S. 490, 501 (1975).
15. Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252,261 (1977);
Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 41-42 (1976).
16. I have argued elsewhere that despite statements to the contrary in Duke Power Co. v.
Carolina Envtl. Study Group, Inc., 438 U.S. 59, 74 (1978), the causation and redressability re-
quirements are distinct. See Nichol, Causation, supra note 3, at 198-201; see also Larson v. Va-
lente, 456 U.S. 228, 269-70 (1982) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); Community Nutrition Inst. v. Block,
698 F.2d 1239, 1245 n.28 (D.C. Cir. 1983); C. WRIGHT, THE LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS 68-69 &
n.43 (4th ed. 1983).
17. Simon v. Eastern Ky. 'Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 38 (1976); Warth v. Seldin, 422
U.S. 490, 508 (1975); see also Director, Office of Workers' Compensation Programs v. Perini N.
River Assocs., 103 S. Ct. 634, 641 (1983); Blum v. Yarestky, 457 U.S. 991 (1982); Larson v. Va-
lente, 456 U.S. 228, 242-43 & n.15 (1982).
18. Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of Church & State,
Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 474 (1982).
19. Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 499 (1975).
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stract questions of wide public significance" or mere "generalized
grievance[s]," z since they are more appropriately addressed to the
other branches of government. Finally, standing law purportedly re-
quires that the plaintiff's claim fall within "the zone of interests to be
protected or regulated by the statute or constitutional guarantee in
question."'' 2 These judicial incantations, however, provide neither a re-
liable tool to predict the outcome of standing cases nor an accurate
description of the law regulating access to the federal courts.
That the Court often ignores these requirements of standing is ob-
vious. Despite the particularized injury requirement, for example, the
Court does, on occasion, hear cases in which there is either no injury or
at least no particularized injury.2 2 Nor is the injury requirement a gen-
uine hurdle to standing granted by statute2-a fact not easily under-
stood if standing is not a separation of powers doctrine.24 The Court
has converted the second requirement, causation, into a demand for
specific pleading.25  Just as inexplicably, specific pleading has some-
times been treated as if it were a modem aberration.2 6  The re-
dressability requirement, so easily described in judicial opinions, has
been applied with such a determined inconsistency that it can likely be
explained only by the Court's view of the merits of the cases.27 The
20. Id. at 499-500. See also Gladstone, Realtors v. Village of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91, 99-100
(1979); Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Envtl. Study Group, Inc., 438 U.S. 59, 80 (1978).
21. Association of Data Processing Serv. Orgs. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 153 (1970).
22. See, e.g., Mueller v. Allen, 103 S. Ct. 3062 (1983); Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349 (1975);
Norwood v. Harrison, 413 U.S. 455 (1973); Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672 (1971); Flast v.
Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 (1968).
23. See Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 41 n.22 (1976); Warth v.
Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 501 (1975).
24. "The fundamental aspect of standing is that it focuses on the party seeking to get his
complaint before a federal court and not on the issues he wishes to have adjudicated." Flast v.
Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 99 (1968).
25. The causation requirement, in its present form, was announced in Warth v. Seldin, 422
U.S. 490 (1975). Requiring that injury be "fairly traceable" to the challenged acts of the defen-
dant, the Court denied standing because "a plaintiff who seeks to challenge exclusionary zoning
practices must allege specific, concrete facts demonstrating that the challenged practices harm
him." Id. at 508 (emphasis in original). See also Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426
U.S. 26, 45 (1976). Accordingly, in both Warth and Simon, the Court inverted normal pleading
presumptions by refusing to allow normal inferences to be drawn from general allegations, and
dismissed for lack of standing.
26. In a 1980 case, plaintiffs were allowed to contest a ruling concerning irrigation rights
under the theory that they would be better able to purchase land, despite the absence of specific
pleadings concerning their financial ability to buy property. Bryant v. Yellen, 447 U.S. 352, 367-
68 (1980). More significantly, in Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman, 455 U.S. 363 (1982), the Court
refused to dismiss a claim based upon harm to the "benefits of interracial associations" even
though it did not appear from the complaint that the defendants' conduct had anything to do with
the neighborhoods in which the plaintiffs lived. Id. at 376-77. Pointing to the "liberal federal
pleading standards," the Court ruled dismissal on the pleadings "inappropriate" absent further
factual development. Id. at 377-78.
27. The article III requirement that a plaintiff demonstrate that his injury is redressable has
[Vol. 72:68
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Court has fashioned a rule for standing in taxpayer cases that bears no
relationship to the plaintift's interest in litigation,28 and then has inter-
preted the rule in a nonsensical fashion.29 The Court also ignores the
"zone of interest" mandate3 -- especially when it would appear to be
dispositive of the standing issue.31 Worst of all, occasionally the Court
has skipped over difficult standing issues entirely in order to proceed
directly to the merits of attractive cases.32
The record, in short, is not good. In fact the law of standing has
become so disjointed that the danger now exists that the Court will
come to accept it as a manipulable doctrine whose primary value lies in
its ability to serve nonjurisdictional ends. Standing law is unsatisfac-
tory in part, of course, because of unprincipled decisionmaking. More
importantly, however, its shortcomings can also be traced to the weak-
ness of its claimed foundation-injury in fact.
A. Tracking Injury
The entire body of modem standing law has its roots in the con-
cept of injury in fact. When the Supreme Court adopted the injury-in-
fact test in the 1970 decision Association of Data Processing Service Or-
fluctuated as well. See Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Envtl. Study Group, Inc., 438 U.S. 59,75 n.20
(1978) (plaintiff must show a "substantial likelihood"); Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropoli-
tan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 262 (1977) (plaintiff must show that injury is "likely to be
redressed"); Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 45 (1976) ("prospective relief
will remove the harm") (emphasis added). Accordingly, there seems to be a general consensus
that the Court has downplayed redressability problems when it was anxious to render a decision
on the merits while it has raised insurmountable hurdles in cases considered less desirable. Com-
pare Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26 (1976) (denying standing because the
injuries were not redressable), and Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490 (1975) (same), and Linda R.S. v.
Richard D., 410 U.S. 614 (1973) (same), with South Dakota v. Neville, 103 S. Ct. 916 (1983)
(allowing standing even though it was quite uncertain that the injuries would be redressed by a
favorable decision), and Bryant v. Yellen, 447 U.S. 352 (1980) (same), and Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S.
268 (1979) (same), and Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 280-81 n.14 (1978)
(same), and Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Envtl. Study Group, Inc., 438 U.S. 59 (1978). See also
K. DAvis, supra note 3, § 22.02-12, at 352-55; Nichol, Causation, supra note 3, at 206-13; Sedler,
supra note 3; Tushnet, supra note 3.
28. See Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 102-04 (1968) (describing nexus test for taxpayer
standing).
29. See Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of Church &
State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 480 & n.17 (1982) (distinguishing between government gifts of money
and real estate in measuring the requisites of article III); see also Nichol, Standing, supra note 3,
at 813-15.
30. Professor Davis claims that between 1970 and 1982 the zone of interest test went unmen-
tioned in twenty-five Supreme Court cases in which it appears to have been relevant. K. DAVIS,
supra note 3, § 22.00, at 327.
31. See, eg., Bryant v. Yellen, 447 U.S. 352 (1980); Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Envtl.
Study Group, Inc., 438 U.S. 59 (1978). See also K. DAvis, supra note 3, § 22.02-11, at 347-49.
32. See, e.g., Mueller v. Allen, 103 S. Ct. 3062 (1983); On v. On, 440 U.S. 268 (1979); Re-
gents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978); Norwood v. Harrison, 413 U.S. 455
(1973); Adler v. Board of Educ., 342 U.S. 485 (1952).
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ganizations, Inc. v. Camp,33 it apparently sought to accomplish two im-
portant objectives. First, it sought to liberalize access to the federal
courts.34 Second, the Court attempted to give content to the Adminis-
trative Procedure Act's grant of standing to a person "aggrieved by
agency action within the meaning of a relevant statute." 5
More important for analytical purposes, however, is the Court's
search in Data Processing for an overriding principle, removed from
the likelihood of ultimate recovery, the desirability of the claim on the
merits, or principles of separation of powers, to instruct the threshold
standing inquiry.36  In theory, therefore, the injury-in-fact principle
seeks to establish a minimum quantum of constitutionally required
harm-hopefully to be measured in something akin to an objective
fashion-necessary to invoke the federal judicial power. The injury-in-
fact standard sought to broaden judicial access by diverting attention
from the legal interests asserted-which, under pre-Data Processing
standards, easily folded the standing inquiry into a decision on the
merits-to objective, concrete harm. Consider the appellation itself-
injury in fact-as distinguished, one supposes, from injury protected by
law. The monetary loss that arises from the competition of national
banks, for example, is objective and indisputable without regard for
any "legal" interest. Thus, as a standing principle, injury in fact
seemed ideal since it ensured a personal stake by hinging itself to harm
and separating itself from the claim on the merits because it was not
dependent upon interests created or protected by law.37
This concept of standing performed well initially. In the years im-
mediately following Data Processing, the Court interpreted its liberal-
33. 397 U.S. 150 (1970).
34. "Mhe trend is toward enlargement of the class of people who may protest administrative
action." Id at 154.
35. Id. at 153 (quoting 5 U.S.C. § 702 (1982)).
36. The injury-in-fact test replaced the much criticized legal interest test. The legal interest
test, in a somewhat circular fashion, required the plaintiff to establish injury to a legally protected
interest in order to overcome the standing hurdle. Tennessee Elec. Power Co. v. Tennessee Valley
Auth., 306 U.S. 118, 137 (1939). I will argue in the final sections of this Article that a rational
standing doctrine cannot be completely separated from consideration of the issues involved in the
litigation, since standing analysis often requires an examination of the protective intent reflected
in both statutes and constitutional provisions.
37. One could argue, of course, that the zone of interest test, which also had its origins in
Data Processing, is evidence that the Court still sought to cling to the merits. Justice Brennan
accused the Court of such in his opinion in Barlow v. Collins, 397 U.S. 159, 168-78 (1970) (Bren-
nan, J., concurring in the result and dissenting). Yet the zone of interest test has been more con-
spicuous in its absence than in its employment. See K. DAvis, supra note 3, § 22.02-11.
Moreover, the injury standard, as employed by the Burger Court throughout the mid-1970's, has
evidenced the Court's clear yearning to tie the standard to concrete, nonlegal injury, whether or
not that was the intent of Justice Douglas in Data Processing. Nichol, Backing into the Future: the
Burger Court and the Federal Forum, 30 KAN. L. REv. 341, 345-50 (1982).
[Vol. 72:68
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ized standard to encompass various forms of economic loss,38 the threat
of criminal prosecution,39 and even esthetic or environmental inju-
ries.40 Each of these harms, quite distinct from any interest established
by statute or constitutional provision, created standing where it would
have been questionable before.
The injury-in-fact test, however, soon began to break away from
its moorings. The Court, in giving standing to environmental claims,
relied on injuries that were not only intangible, but also subjective in
the sense that they necessarily depended upon the psychological
makeup of the plaintiff. In its prior decisions concerning legislative re-
apportionment 4' and the establishment clause,42 the Court found suffi-
cient injuries such as vote dilution and the degradation resulting from
the "union of government and religion."43 Such harms could not be
separated from legal interests as easily as the Court might have hoped
when it created the Data Processing standard. As a final complication,
Congress began to grant statutory standing" even when the interests to
be asserted were relatively abstract and widely shared.45
The Burger Court responded to this recognition of intangible, sub-
jective, shared, or legally related injuries by attempting to tighten the
injury-in-fact standard. Article III now requires "distinct" and "palpa-
ble" injury.46 No judicial definition of the new term has been offered,
but I assume it requires that a litigant suffer tangible injury that distin-
guishes him from the populace at large. The cases reveal, however,
that despite valiant attempts the Court has been unable to maintain
such a line. The difficulty has arisen because the injury standard is
being asked to do much more than it was designed to accomplish, and
much more than it can reasonably be expected to achieve.
A brief review of the Court's injury cases indicates that even under
the new test, intangible injuries have been used to establish standing.
A few examples are instructive. In United States v. Students Challeng-
ing Regulatory Agency Procedures (SCRAp),47 a group of law students
feared that higher Interstate Commerce Commission rates would raise
the cost of recycled products, discourage their use, and thereby eventu-
38. Barlow v. Collins, 397 U.S. 159 (1970).
39. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
40. United States v. SCRAP, 412 U.S. 669 (1973); Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727
(1972).
41. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
42. School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963); Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962).
43. Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 431 (1962).
44. See infra text accompanying notes 93-97.
45. See, e.g., Endangered Species Act of 1973, 16 U.S.C. § 1540(g) (1982) (granting standing
to "any person"). See Tennessee Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153 (1978).
46. Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 501 (1975).
47. United States v. SCRAP, 412 U.S. 669 (1973).
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ally degrade environmental quality. The Court held that these facts
satisfied the injury requirement. Similarly, in Havens Realty Corp. v.
Coleman, the Court permitted a pro-integration group to litigate based
on an alleged impairment to its "ability to provide counseling and re-
ferral services" resulting from the racial steering practices of a realtor.48
Although the establishment clause has been said not to be enforceable
in its own right,49 in School District v. Schempp5 ° the Court granted
children standing to contest optional school prayer. Taxpayers have
successfully mounted challenges to loans and transfers to parochial
schools if accomplished by local government;5' and last term in Mueller
v. Allen, 52 the Court held that taxpayers had standing to object to state
tax credits granted to parents of children enrolled in parochial schools.
Curiously, however, litigants asserting other intangible constitu-
tional interests have often been turned away. The Court has repeatedly
claimed that a litigant suffers no constitutional injury when he com-
plains merely of government irregularity. Accordingly, the citizens'
claims in United States v. Richardson that the failure to publish the
budget of the CIA violated article I, section 9,53 and in Schlesinger v.
Reservists Committee to Stop the War that the incompatibility clause
prevented a member of Congress from holding a commission in the
Armed Forces Reserve,54 could not provide appropriate bases for
standing. Nor, in Valley Forge, did the federal government's transfer
of public property to a religious organization in apparent violation of
the establishment clause "injure" the plaintiff." Flast v. Cohen, how-
ever, apparently lives, as do the reapportionment cases.56 Therefore,
here too, the Court has been unable to maintain a clear line; the injury
suffered from "mere government illegality" is a fluctuating one.
48. Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman, 455 U.S. 363, 379 (1982). Unlike the other plaintiffs in
Havens, the HOME organization could not claim standing under the Fair Housing Act alone.
The majority opinion, however, treated the impairment of counseling opportunity, without more,
as injury in fact.
49. Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of Church & State,
Inc., 454 U.S. 464 (1982).
50. School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963); Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962).
Schempp and Vitale, of course, were decided prior to the adoption of the "distinct and palpable"
language. The Burger Court, however, has shown no willingness to abandon the analysis used in
these cases. The Court's recent affirmance of the Schempp and Vitale decisions on the merits
indicates implicit approval of the standing grants in those cases. See Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S.
39 (1980) (per curiam).
51. Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349 (1975).
52. Mueller v. Allen, 103 S. Ct. 3062 (1983).
53. United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166 (1974).
54. Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208 (1974).
55. Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of Church & State,
Inc., 454 U.S. 464 (1982).
56. See Marsh v. Chambers, 103 S. Ct. 3330 (1983); Mueller v. Allen, 103 S. Ct. 3062 (1983);
Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672 (1971); see also Gaffney v. Cummings, 412 U.S. 735 (1973).
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In addition, the Court has inconsistently applied the threat of fu-
ture harm as a measure of injury. The Court recently ruled that the
threatened imposition of a state registration and reporting requirement
on religious organizations "surely amounts to a distinct and palpable
injury.""7 Yet, the employment of a government surveillance pro-
gram 8 and a claimed pattern of police brutality5 9 provided insufficient
demonstration of existing harm. As recently as its last Term, the Court
ruled in City of Los Angeles v. Lyons,60 that a plaintiff who had been
the victim of a near-fatal police choke hold had no stake in contesting
the future use of the practice.
A recent court of appeals decision illustrates the thinness and arti-
ficiality of the injury line that the Court is apparently attempting to
draw. In American Civil Liberties Union v. Rabun County Chamber of
Commerce61 the plaintiffs challenged the existence of a large illumi-
nated cross privately erected in a state park. Under Supreme Court
decisions, it would have been difficult for the plaintiffs to challenge the
religious display merely as separationists.62 The American Civil Liber-
ties Union, therefore, claimed that several of its members were injured
as environmentalists--the presence of the cross harming their camping
pleasures.6" Using that theory, the plaintiffs were able to achieve
standing. In fact, the standing issue was complicated only because the
plaintiffs complained of a cross rather than a pile of trash-a fact that
one would think would enhance rather than weaken the access claim in
our system of government.
How then is the constitutionally mandated injury requirement to
be measured? The objective magnitude of the harm cannot be the stan-
dard. In Roe v. Wade,' for example, the Court denied standing to a
married couple who had been warned by doctors that abortion would
be safer for the wife's health than either pregnancy or the use of contra-
ceptives. The couple had sought to obtain standing based upon a
claimed injury to "marital happiness" resulting from an abortion ban.
Surely those plaintiffs, or the past choke-hold victim in City of LosAn-
geles v. Lyons65 suffered greater present harms at the hands of the de-
fendants than did the law students in SCRAP or the counseling group
57. Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228, 241 (1982).
58. Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1 (1972).
59. Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362 (1976).
60. City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 103 S. Ct. 1660 (1983).
61. 678 F.2d 1379 (1lth Cir. 1982).
62. See, eg., Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of Church
& State, Inc., 454 U.S. at 486 n.22.
63. 678 F.2d at 1384.
64. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
65. 103 S. Ct. 1660 (1983).
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in Havens Realty. Nor can the perceived quantity of injury explain the
different results in Schlesinger, Baker v. Carr, Valley Forge, or last
Term's decision in Mueller v. Allen.66
Despite the fact that neither the quantum of harm nor the explana-
tions of the Court reveal the boundaries of constitutional injury, pat-
terns in the decisions are ascertainable-if one pays attention to what
the Court does rather than what it says. Most intangible interests that
have been presented by litigants can provide the basis for injury-un-
less the interests were considered so important by the Framers that they
were written into the constitutional text. In that event, the Court usu-
ally characterizes the interest as "generalized." It also appears that
"preferred" constitutional claims provide a greater likelihood of federal
access than do "insignificant" provisions.67 Further, when standing is
not granted by statute, it is more readily achieved when the cause of
action is grounded in statutory rather than constitutional protections.68
These factors, along with the language employed in a few decisions,
suggest that the definition of constitutional injury is greatly affected by
separation of powers considerations 69 and federalism interests. 70 Per-
haps most often, the standing inquiry is a veiled reflection of the
Court's view of the attractiveness of the litigant's case on the merits. 71
Unfortunately for the students of article III jurisprudence, however,
every one of these considerations is supposed to be irrelevant to the
standing determination.72
The distinct and palpable injury standard has failed to provide a
66. 103 S. Ct. 3062 (1983).
67. Compare Norwood v. Harrison, 413 U.S. 455 (1973) (equal protection), and Flast v. Co-
hen, 392 U.S. 83 (1968) (establishment clause), and Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962) (equal
protection), with Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208 (1974) (incompat-
ibility clause), and United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166 (1974) (art. 1, § 9, cl. 7). But see
Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of Church & State, Inc., 454
U.S. 464 (1982).
68. See, e.g., Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman, 455 U.S. 363 (1982) (HOME plaintiffs); Watt
v. Energy Action Educ. Found., 454 U.S. 151 (1981); Bryant v. Yellen, 447 U.S. 352 (1980); United
States v. SCRAP, 412 U.S. 669 (1973); see also Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War,
418 U.S. 208, 239-40 (1974) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
69. See, e.g., United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166 (1974); Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1
(1972).
70. See City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 103 S. Ct. 1660 (1983); Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362
(1976); O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488 (1974).
71. Compare Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362 (1976) (allegations of police brutality), with Duke
Power Co. v. Carolina Envtl. Study Group, Inc., 438 U.S. 59 (1978) (allegations of environmental
harm from nuclear power plants).
72. Recall, for example, the statement in Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 100 (1968), that the
"question whether a particular person is a proper party to maintain the action does not, by its own
force, raise separation of powers problems." In addition, the Supreme Court also indicated in
Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of Church & State, Inc., 454
U.S. 464, 484 (1982), that there can be no preferred list or "hierarchy" of constitutional rights.
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neutral and objectively ascertainable method of measuring access to
the federal courts. As standing jurisprudence began to embrace subjec-
tive and intangible interests, the term "injury in fact" offered little gui-
dance in measuring the scope of the case or controversy requirement.
At the same time, when faced with shared constitutional claims, the
Court began to sense that liberal standing rules posed a threat to the
appropriate separation of powers. The Court's response, rather than
tying constitutional harm to comprehensible standards, has been to
taint its analysis of harm by including extraneous considerations. If the
particularized injury standard was designed to supply an overarching
measurement of judicial authority, removed from the merits of the
claim or concern for separation of powers, it no longer performs that
task.
B. Injury and Redressabiliy
The injury concept has suffered from judicial manipulation by its
use in redressability analysis as well. For more than a decade, standing
doctrine has required that the injury asserted by the plaintiff be likely
to be redressed by a favorable decision.7 3 The nature of the interplay
between redressability and injury, however, has apparently escaped the
Burger Court.
Consider a few examples. In Linda AS. v. Richard .74 the
mother of an illegitimate child challenged the discriminatory enforce-
ment of a Texas child support statute. The statute had been construed
to apply to married parents only. The Court ruled that the plaintiff
failed to meet the redressability hurdle since the requested relief-non-
discriminatory enforcement-would not ensure the payment of sup-
port.75 Two years later, in Warth v. Seldin,76 the Court held that
plaintiffs seeking to challenge the exclusionary zoning practices of
Penfield, New York failed to satisfy the redressability standard because
they could not prove that they would actually be able to obtain housing
if the ordinance were invalidated. Finally, in Simon v. Eastern Ken-
tucky Wefare Rights Organization ,'77 several indigents attempted to
challenge a revenue ruling that allowed hospitals to qualify for
favorable tax treatment even if they reduced service to indigents. The
plaintiffs claimed that the allegedly illegal ruling resulted in the denial
of hospital access to the poor. Concluding that even if the challengers
prevailed, it was just as plausible that hospitals would elect to forgo
73. See, eg., Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614 (1973).
74. Id.
75. Id. at 618-19.
76. 422 U.S. 490, 504 (1975).
77. 426 U.S. 26 (1976).
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favorable tax treatment rather than shoulder the costs of expanded
treatment of indigents, the Court ruled that the redressability require-
ment had not been met.78
Such cases demonstrate the ease with which the Court, by toying
with the scope of the injury at issue, can raise or lower the re-
dressability hurdle. In Linda A S., Warth, and Simon, the Court over-
stated the injuries that the plaintiffs sought to have redressed. In Linda
AS., the Court refused jurisdiction because even a decree requiring
nondiscriminatory enforcement would not ensure support. But why
was obtaining the payment of child support considered the relevant in-
jury? The mother in Linda AS. sought to be treated on an equal basis
with married mothers. Her injury-denial of equal treatment-would
undoubtedly have been redressed by an affirmative decree requiring
enforcement of child support obligations against unmarried fathers.
Similarly, the Warth plaintiffs sought not only to obtain housing in
Penfield. They also asserted their interest in equal participation in a
housing market not distorted by unconstitutional zoning practices. The
denial of a meaningful opportunity to persuade others to construct low
cost housing in Penfield, for example, would have been redressed by a
determination that the ordinance was unconstitutional. The indigents
in Simon had no objection to receiving hospital access, but the interest
they asserted would more appropriately be described as having hospital
decisions concerning the services offered to indigents accurately reflect
an earlier incentive structure implicitly approved by the Congress.79
Again, that injury would have been redressed by the claim presented.
The Court, however, has not always construed "injury" so
broadly. In Larson v. Valente,80 the Unification Church challenged the
registration and reporting requirements of Minnesota's charitable solic-
itations act. These requirements did not apply to religious organiza-
tions that received more than half of their contributions from their own
members. Claiming that the Unification Church failed the fifty percent
test, Minnesota threatened to enforce the requirements against the
Church. The Church responded by seeking injunctive relief. During
the course of the litigation Minnesota asserted in addition that the
Church failed to come within the terms of the reporting exemption be-
cause it was not a religious organization. Under this second theory a
redressability question arose since even if the Unification Church suc-
ceeded in its challenge to the fifty percent donation rule, it would not
be assured exemption if the state prevailed on the religion issue.81 The
78. Id. at 43-46.
79. See Chayes, supra note 3, at 18-19.
80. 456 U.S. 228 (1982).
81. Id. at 268-71 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
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majority, however, rejected this characterization and granted standing
based on the threatened application of the fifty percent rule, without
more, as the relevant injury for redressability purposes . 2 That injury
could be redressed by a favorable decision even if the Church later lost
on the religion issue.
Equal protection cases provide the clearest examples of the Court's
inability to maintain a principled line. In the Regents of the University
of Caiffornia v. Bakke,83 a substantial question arose concerning Alan
Bakke's ability to prove that he would have been admitted to medical
school absent the contested affirmative action program. The Court
skirted the standing issue, however, by declaring that the university's
"decision not to permit Bakke to compete for all 100 places"84 was the
relevant injury. That harm would, of course, be redressed by a
favorable ruling. If, however, the Warth plaintiffs could redress their
injuries only by showing that they would actually obtain housing, and
if the mother in Linda AS. was required to show that she would actu-
ally receive support payments, Bakke should have been made to prove
that he would have gotten into medical school. The interest in equal
opportunity was insufficient to provide standing in Linda AS. and
Warth, but it eventually got Alan Bakke into medical school.8 5
A hypothetical brings the issue into better focus. Suppose that an
exclusive suburb, separately incorporated, passed a statute prohibiting
blacks from purchasing housing in the locale. Assume further that the
suburb is composed entirely of ten-acre privately owned parcels, each
valued in excess of $500,000. The facts, as developed, indicate that no
one in the suburb has present plans to sell. How would plaintiffs
achieve standing in such a case? Must they not only be black, but also
be able to prove capacity and willingness to buy a $500,000 home?
Even if the plaintiffs make that showing, is their injury nonredressable
without proof of a willing seller? Under Warth, standing would be de-
nied unless the plaintiffs were black, rich, and had a seller in tow.
Under Bakke they could obtain standing merely by showing that the
statute denied them the opportunity to seek housing at that locale. My
82. 456 U.S. at 242-44.
83. 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
84. Id. at 280 n.14.
85. Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268 (1979), presents the same problem. There, a successful equal
protection challenge was mounted to an Alabama statutory scheme that allowed alimony recovery
against husbands but not wives. Particularly troubling for redressability purposes, however, was
the fact that the alimony obligation was fixed by a prior agreement between the parties, which
appeared to be enforceable under state law. The majority opinion ignored the standing problem,
but the dissenting Justices claimed that the injury was nonredressable. Id at 296-98 (Rehnquist,
J., dissenting). It was nonredressable, of course, if the harm was being forced to pay alimony.




guess is that if such a case arose, the Court would be even more lenient,
and ask no more of a plaintiff than that he be black. 6 That, however,
is because of the attractiveness of the claim on the merits.
Which injury should be the focus of the inquiry? Under the
Court's standing jargon, an apparent dilemma exists. If Bakke and
Larson are the rule, that is, if redressability of the governmental dis-
crimination is sufficient and it is unnecessary for the plaintiffs to show
that they will achieve the "ultimate" goal of their efforts-the purchase
of a $500,000 home-do not the litigants assert mere generalized claims
to good government? Does not the concrete harm, sought so eagerly by
the particularized injury standard, become constitutionally irrelevant?
But if Warth and Simon state the correct principle, will not the Court
be forced to say that black plaintiffs who have less than $500,000 have
no standing because even if the suburb discriminates, that in no way
changes the plaintiffs' lives?
Cases like Linda AS., Warth, and Bakke, therefore, have
presented major standing problems. The "particularized harm" as-
serted by the plaintiffs was actually exclusion from participation. Since
the litigants could not demonstrate with certainty that they would be
successful in their ultimate pursuits even if allowed to participate, their
claims collapsed to mere allegations of equality denied. Under a strict
injury-in-fact standard, it is not enough to claim that the Government
has treated you unfairly. The standard also requires plaintiffs to show
that they lost something tangible in the process (e.g., money, a house, a
seat in a medical school class, etc.). Bakke and Larson demonstrate, of
course, that such a harsh line has, on occasion, proven too much for the
Supreme Court to countenance. I will argue below, however, that the
dilemma,87 like the difficulties that have arisen from defining injury
generally, surfaces only because the particularized harm standard has
been applied in areas of standing analysis beyond its relevance and
beyond its utility.
C. The Relevance of Injury
Over thirty years ago in Joint An/i-Fascist Refugee Committee v.
McGrath, Justice Frankfurter made the following observation:88 "A
86. See Trafficante v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 205 (1972). 1 will argue that in a
case like the posed hypothetical, standing should be considered directly under the equal protection
clause. See infra text accompanying notes 98-113 and 137-40. Conceding a "stake" reflected in
interests created by the equal protection clause, however, a federal court might well demand that a
plaintiff demonstrate that his dispute with the hypothetical suburb is not purely abstract. Accord-
ingly, a showing that the plaintiff actually seeks the opportunity to obtain housing in the suburb
would be appropriate.
87. See infra text accompanying note 113.
88. 341 U.S. 123, 152 (1950) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
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litigant ordinarily has standing to challenge governmental action of a
sort that, if taken by a private person, would create a right of action
cognizable by the courts. ... Or standing may be based on an inter-
est created by the Constitution or a statute." Thus, legally cognizable
interests, Frankfurter claimed, could arise from three sources: (a)
analogous common law rights, (b) statutory and (c) constitutional guar-
antees. Even under the restrictive views of the time, there was no doubt
that legal interests, capable of sustaining standing, could be directly
created either by legislation or by the Constitution.8 9 But the analysis
of statutorily and constitutionally based standing claims has been ham-
pered by the relatively recent adoption of the injury-in-fact standard as
an overriding standing requirement. While the injury standard has
proven to be an effective tool in the liberalization of judicial access in
general, to my mind it has a place in our standing jurisprudence, if at
all, only as a means of ascertaining which interests qualify for judicial
recognition under (a) above. That claim is, no doubt, a bit strange on
its face. None--or indeed very few--of the myriad interests that are
the subjects of controversial modem standing decisions had analogous
counterparts at common law. But, of the three categories of legal inter-
ests listed by Frankfurter, rights based upon comparable common law
determinations are the only ones having their source in judge-made
law.90
With the Warren Court's tremendous expansion of public law, the
standing framework described by Justice Frankfurter proved too
cramped. As the progeny of Ex parte Young 9 multiplied, standing
based upon express statutory grants or analogies to a relatively closed
set of common law protections fell out of step with the development of
substantive federal law. As a result, of course, the Court scrapped the
legal interest test in favor of the injury-in-fact standard. The injury
standard of Data Processing sought to ascertain, given the breakdown
of the legal interest test, which values the judiciary would recognize as
sufficient to invoke federal jurisdiction. The Court's answer, of course,
was that only those persons actually harmed by the defendant had a
sufficient constitutional stake in the litigation. Nothing in the historical
progression of standing analysis, however, should indicate that the con-
crete injury requirement should limit plaintiffs seeking to protect statu-
tory or constitutionally based interests.
The determination of which injuries may properly trigger the fed-
89. See, e.g., Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678 (1946).
90. That is not to deny, of course, that judges "make" constitutional law. Even so, such
judicial analysis rightly claims the Constitution as its source. See Nichol, Giving Substance Its
Due, 93 YALE LJ. 171 (1983).
91. 209 U.S. 123 (1908). See Scott, supra note 3.
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eral judicial power is, as the two previous Sections demonstrate, hardly
a neutral, value-free process. It probably cannot be. I think that Pro-
fessor Vining has correctly characterized it as an exercise in defining
"public values."92 Yet the judiciary is not the only entity that plays the
game. Congress certainly defines public values through legislation, and
the Constitution can be understood to reflect consensus values ratified
by the people as a whole. The concrete injury requirement should be
no limit to those efforts.
The effort to keep statutory standing within the framework of the
"distinct and palpable" standard has led to amusing results. First, the
Court has announced that injury in fact is required by the Constitution
but that federal statutes conferring standing automatically meet this
mandate.93 Second, the Court, employing this circular reasoning, has
accepted interests which are obviously not "distinct and palpable" as
appropriate bases for standing.94 Actually, the Court has little room, at
least under existing constitutional law, to overturn any congressional
grant of standing. Given the confused state of article III jurisprudence,
if Congress chooses to implement federal policies through the employ-
ment of the judiciary in actual lawsuits the Supreme Court would be
hard pressed to deny that such efforts are necessary and proper exer-
cises of congressional authority. Of more direct relevance, however, is
the ability of Congress to "create legally enforceable rights where none
before existed." 95 When such rights are invaded, standing exists.96 Ac-
cordingly, the Congress could most likely create rights of the most ethe-
real sort, for example, rights to honest government, an efficient
bureaucracy, or an integrated society, and grant standing to "any per-
son" to enforce them. Under such a scenario, the Supreme Court
could, one assumes, maintain the facade that the plaintiffs suffered
92. J. VINING, supra note 3, at 171.
93. See, e.g., Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490,500-01,509-10 (1975); Linda R.S. v. Richard D.,
410 U.S. 614, 617 n.3 (1973); L. TRIBE, supra note 3, § 3-18, at 80; Monaghan, supra note 3, at
1381.
94. The Endangered Species Act provides that "any person" may commence an action to
enforce the provision's dictates. 16 U.S.C. § 1540(g) (1982). My subjective concern over the possi-
ble extinction of the snail-darter, for example, is intangible and shared. Yet the standing issue was
not even addressed in Tennessee Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153 (1978). In Havens Realty
Corp. v. Coleman, 455 U.S. 363 (1982), and in Trafficante v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S.
205 (1972), the Court allowed standing based upon new statutorily created rights to the "benefits
of living in an integrated community," Havens Realty, 455 U.S. at 375; Trafficante, 409 U.S. at
208, and the right to "truthful housing information," Havens Realt,, 455 U.S. at 375. Consider,
also, the broad standing provisions reflected in the Federal Surface Mining and Reclamation Act,
30 U.S.C. § 1270 (Supp. V 1981), the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7604 (Supp. V 1981), and the
Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1982).
95. Oklahoma v. United States Civil Serv. Comm'n, 330 U.S. 127, 136 (1947). See Warth v.
Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 514 (1975).
96. See Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614, 617 n.3 (1973).
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"distinct and palpable" injuries. What must be acknowledged realisti-
cally, however, is that the Couit's concrete injury requirement does not
apply to standing granted by statute.97
What about a plaintiff who seeks standing on the basis of injury to
a constitutionally based interest? Stripped of the fiction of standing
grounded in the plaintiffs status as, for example, a taxpayer or citizen,
Schempp,98 F/ast,99 Richardson,100 Reservists,10 1 and Valley Forge10 2
are all cases in which the plaintiffs sought standing merely on the basis
of harm to constitutionally created interests. Only in Valley Forge,
however, did the Court directly address the general question of
whether standing could be founded upon a bare allegation of constitu-
tional irregularity. In that case, the Court rejected the Third Circuit's
grant of standing based on an alleged injury to the plaintiffs' "personal
constitutional right"'10 3 to separation of church and state because the
injury was not distinct and palpable. Writing for the Court, Justice
Rehnquist, stating that actions based directly on the Bill of Rights have
"no place in our constitutional scheme,"'14 characterized the claim as a
mere assertion of the right to a particular kind of government con-
duct-the sort of generalized grievance prohibited by article 111.105
Justice Rehnquist's claim, however, does not ring entirely true.
The Constitution does create affirmative, judicially enforceable
rights. 10 6 In cases recognizing implied causes of action springing from
the Constitution, such as Bivens v. Six Unknown NamedAgents of Fed-
eral Bureau of Narcotics'O7 and Davis v. Passman, ' ° the Court settled
at least that much. Actions based directly on the Bill of Rights do have
a place in our "constitutional scheme." By what principle, however,
can the Court hold as it did in Davis v. Passman, that the due process
clause confers a right to be free from sex discrimination and still assert,
97. See L. TRiNE, supra note 3, § 3-18, at 80.
98. School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963).
99. Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 (1968).
100. United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166 (1974).
101. Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208 (1974).
102. Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of Church & State,
Inc., 454 U.S. 464 (1982).
103. Americans United for Separation of Church & State, Inc. v. HEW, 619 F.2d 252, 265
(3rd Cir. 1980), rev'dsub nom. Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation
of Church & State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464 (1982).
104. 454 U.S. at 489.
105. Id. at 483.
106. See also Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14 (1980) (eighth amendment); Butz v. Economou,
438 U.S. 478 (1978).
107. 403 U.S. 388 (1971) (recognizing a cause of action based directly on the fourth
amendment).
108. 442 U.S. 228 (1979). The Court held specifically that "[tihe equal protection component
of the Due Process Clause ... confers on [the] petitioner a federal constitutional right to be free
from gender discrimination." Id. at 235 (footnote omitted).
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as in Valley Forge, that the establishment clause does not confer a right
to be free from the intermingling of church and state? To the Court's
way of thinking, the difference between the two is that gender discrimi-
nation is a "personal" harm while concern for religious separation is
generalized. The former, therefore, represents distinct and palpable in-
jury and appropriately supports standing, while the latter does not. 109
It is difficult to understand how the Constitution can be read to
authorize the Court to draw this line. Since Marbury v. Madison 110 the
judiciary has invoked its power to redress injuries to legally protected
interests. Since the Constitution, as fundamental law, creates legally
protected interests, it would seem that the entire Constitution creates
such interests. How then and under what theory can the Court decide
that the rights set forth in the fourth amendment are legally cognizable
while those contained in the establishment clause are not? To my
mind, the only "theory" is the Court's #pse dixit that the only constitu-
tional rights enforceable in the federal courts are those that the Court
considers capable of "distinct and palpable" violation. But if Chief
Justice Marshall was right in Marbury that judicial enforcement of the
Constitution represents the difference between true limitation of gov-
ernment powers and a meaningless scrap of paper,'' and if, as seems
likely, the Framers viewed the entire Bill of Rights as constructed on an
equal footing, it is incumbent on the Court to justify its enshrinement
of a hierarchy of constitutional rights which it claims to eschew.
The Supreme Court's creation of a constitutionally required pre-
requisite of distinct and palpable injury analytically "puts the cart
before the horse." As Professor Currie has recently written: "No one
can sue, I should have thought, unless authorized by law to do. so
. . 112 Apparently, however, the Court no longer asks that question
to determine standing. Instead, the Court premises the entire standing
inquiry upon a particularized injury standard which, in the context of
difficult modern decisions, is essentially incomprehensible.
The injury cases discussed earlier point up the shortcomings of the
109. Apparently, School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963), Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83
(1968), Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228 (1979), Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed.
Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971), Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962), Norwood v. Harri-
son, 413 U.S. 455 (1973), and Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672 (1971), fall on the "bright side"
of the particularized harm requirement, and Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United
for Separation of Church & State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464 (1982), United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S.
166 (1974), and Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208 (1974), do not.
See Nichol, Standing, supra note 3, at 832-36.
110. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
111. "To what purpose are powers limited, and to what purpose is that limitation committed
to writing, if these limits may, at any time, be passed by those intended to be restrained?" Id. at
176.
112. Currie, supra note 3, at 42.
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present method of analysis. In cases like Richardson, Reservists, and
Valley Forge, the Court manipulated its standing guidelines-claiming,
for example, to hear only cases based upon individual, tangible harm-
so as to serve interests (e.g., separation of powers) extraneous to the
standing determination. Rather than asking if the litigant's injuries
were concrete, the standing question should have turned on whether
the constitutional provisions on which the plaintiffs relied create legal
interests arguably violated by the acts of the defendants.
Under this analysis, many of the redressability cases would have
received different treatment as well. In Linda AS., Warth, and Bakke,
for example, the plaintiffs could have asserted two sets of interests to
achieve standing. Under Data Processing, they could attempt to obtain
standing based upon potential concrete injuries--the loss of child sup-
port, housing, and a seat in medical school. The plaintiffs' standing
claims could also have been considered directly under the equal protec-
tion clause. Davis v. Passman1 3 would appear to be good authority to
support their arguments, and no redressability problems would have
been presented.
This discussion has pointed to three major shortcomings of present
standing doctrine. First, in turning to particularized injury as an over-
riding standing requirement, the Court has failed to recognize that le-
gally cognizable interests-both tangible and intangible-can be
created by sources of law other than judicial pronouncements. Second,
injury in fact, when employed as a standing requirement, is not self-
defining. Therefore, standing law should begin to include a dialogue
concerning the contours of legally cognizable injury. Third, if case or
controversy decisions are to be comprehensible, the Court should seg-
regate and examine the various factors that influence the employment
of judicial power. The next Part proposes the outlines of a method
with which to remedy these problems.
II
DISSECTING STANDING
The major source of confusion in standing law is that too many
judicial activities take place under one heading. In name, standing fo-
cuses solely "on the party seeking to get his complaint before a federal
court and not on the issue he wishes to have adjudicated."' 14 Yet deci-
sions, purporting to measure the plaintiffs personal stake in the litiga-
tion, have repeatedly considered separation of powers concerns,
federalism interests, the relationship between the injury suffered and
113. 442 U.S. 228 (1979).
114. Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 99 (1968).
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the legal claim asserted, and a variety of other factors. Since the Court
rarely discusses the impact of such extraneous issues on standing deter-
minations, it has substantially muddied the doctrine.
In general terms, the judiciary must address three different sorts of
problems in standing decisions. First, at the core of the standing ques-
tion, as reflected in the constant references to "personal stake," is the
question of whether the plaintiff has sufficient interest in the case to
merit the Court's attention. This inquiry requires an examination of
the nature and extent of the harm sustained. Borrowing a term from
Professor Scott, I refer to this aspect of standing as "access stand-
ing."' 1 5 Second, standing law concerns itself with the determination of
whether, in addition to having requisite personal stake, the litigant is a
proper party to raise the legal issues presented. Third-party standing
and the "standing" of defendants are obvious examples of what I will
call "issue standing." Finally, standing cases often consider whether
the government decision contested is better left in the hands of some
other branch of government. To distinguish such analysis from other
standing inquiries, I will refer to it as "decision standing." 16 Decision
standing, however, as will be seen, is more appropriately subsumed
under the political question doctrine.' 17 Since it relates to the subject
matter of the dispute rather than the parties to the litigation, it is, in
reality, not standing analysis at all.
A. Access Standing
Access standing analyzes whether the plaintiff has made a showing
adequate to satisfy article III, and thereby to open the doors of the
federal courts. It turns on "whether the litigant has a sufficient per-
sonal interest in getting the relief he seeks. . . to warrant recognizing
him as entitled to invoke the court's decision on the issue of illegal-
115. Scott, supra note 3, at 670. Professor Scott has argued persuasively that "access stand-
ing" should be considered quite independently from "decision standing"e-the aspect of the doc-
trine aiming at a proper allocation of governmental policymaking responsibility. Like the
arguments reflected here, Professor Scott suggests a dissection of the standing inquiry in accor-
dance with the various functions the requirement has been forced to serve. Primarily, however, he
argues that "access standing" should abandon its traditional concentration on legally recognized
interests and injuries in favor of an explicit rationing of scarce judicial resources. However, he
readily admits, that decision is one courts are "ill-suited" to make. Id at 682.
116. Again, I borrow another term from Professor Scott, which he used to refer to the alloca-
tion of policymaking responsibility. Id. at 683-85.
117. For a brief discussion of the scope of the political question doctrine, see C. WRIOHT,
supra note 16, § 14. The term "decision standing" as employed here, however, has a potentially
broader sweep than the political question doctrine. Political question analysis examines separa-
tion of powers issues at the federal level. Cases like City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 103 S. Ct. 1660
(1983), Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362 (1976), and O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488 (1974), demon-




ity. t11s If standing is to be a legal doctrine at all, "sufficient personal
interest" must suggest some objective measurement over and above the
plaintiff's subjective concern for the outcome of the case. Restating the
requirement, then, access standing demands simply that a litigant
demonstrate harm to an interest cognizable by law. Such interests can,
I think, be created in three ways. First, the judiciary can interpret arti-
cle III to develop a body of law that seeks to define cognizable injury.
Second, congressional enactments can create interests sufficient to pro-
vide the basis of federal jurisdiction. Finally, the Constitution itself
sets forth legally cognizable interests.
1. Judicially Recognized Interest
As indicated, the Supreme Court has characterized those interests
to which it will give jurisdictional recognition as distinct and palpable
injuries. The determination of what is an appropriately concrete injury
has proven to be both mysterious and erratic-dominated by factors
not always central to the standing issue. Yet even if the Court were to
remove such extraneous pressures from the injury calculus, the concept
of cognizable harm would not be self-defining. Nor would the process
of determining harm be value free.
It is reasonably simple to understand why monetary loss consti-
tutes injury while my personal dissatisfaction with President Reagan's
appointment of James Watt as Secretary of the Interior does not. The
former is objective and even quantitatively measurable. The latter is
subjective, intangible, and not easily distinguished from the myriad
personal disappointments encountered in life. And indeed, law does
not cure all evils.
But what of the distinction between my concern for the preserva-
tion of the grizzly bear and my fear of military surveillance of domestic
political activities? No objective yardstick provides the answer.
Rather, as Professor Vining has argued in his perceptive book Legal
identity,1t9 recognition of judicially cognizable interests is an exercise
in defining public values: "[I]n the very recognition of a 'person' who is
'harmed' courts formally cap the formulation of a value. . ., confirm it
in our language and our thought, and permit a full and continuous
search for its realization to begin."'120
Consider the process. One can recall when the courts would have
called a plaintiff claiming harm because of the acidification of a stream
in a nearby national forest an interloper asserting no injury whatsoever.
118. P. BATOR, P. MISHKIN, D. SHAIRO & H. VECHSLER, HART & WECHSLER's THE FED-
ERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 156 (2d ed. 1973).
119. 3. VININo, supra note 3.
120. Id. at 171.
19841
CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW
As Sierra Club v. Morton 2 ' and SCRAP teach, however, our society,
and in turn, the judiciary, eventually recognized concern for the envi-
ronment as a protectible interest in its own right. In defining those
private, subjective injuries that will be given public recognition through
judicial protection, the clock can run the other way as well. During
substantial periods of our history, for example, whites might well have
considered themselves injured by a governmental decision that forced
them to ride in the same railroad car with blacks. Public acceptance of
such sentiment as a harm, however, no longer exists.
In large part, therefore, the Court's recognition of injury-the
characterization of loss as "personal"-depends on its sympathy for
and understanding of the loss. This aspect of defining injury is evident
in cases like City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, where the Court called the
fear of future "choke-holds" by the police "far short of the allegations
. . . necessary to establish a case or controversy."' 122 The tenor of the
opinion indicates that the Court refused to take the injury claim seri-
ously since the plaintiff would run the risk of similar harm in the future
only if he violated the law. One senses in a variety of cases that the
Court carries little empathy for a litigant who bases future harm on the
possibility of repeated encounters with the criminal justice system. 123 It
is possible, one supposes, that the refusal to recognize harm to "sexual
play"' 24 or "marital happiness" in Roe v. Wade 125 can be explained by
the same lack of empathy.
To say that values are inextricably tied to the standing process and
that the decisions are not easy is not to argue that the federal judiciary
should remove itself from the process of defining injury. Unless it
chooses to trap the law of article III in outdated forms, it cannot do so.
It is to say, however, two things. First, the Court should no longer
pretend to its constituents or to itself that the determination of injury is
an obvious, value-free, and nonmanipulable method of measuring ju-
risdiction. The second point flows readily from the first. Decisions ac-
cepting or rejecting claims of injury should be accompanied by
explanation. Even case or controversy analysis should make an at-
tempt at principled adjudication.
2 Statutory Interest
Congress can create legally enforceable interests even where none
121. 405 U.S. 727 (1972).
122. 103 S. Ct. 1660, 1667 (1983).
123. See, ag., Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362 (1976); O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488 (1974).
124. See J. VINING, supra note 3, at 175.
125. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
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before existed.126 Such interests may be both intangible 27 and widely
shared.'28 In fact, Congress may even create legal interests in the mere
enforcement of its statutory provisions.129 Accordingly, if a statute ex-
pressly gives standing to a plaintiff, legally cognizable interest is
clear.' 30 Statutes which fail to address standing, or which are unclear
in the breadth of standing granted, may create enforceable interests by
implication. Thus, in Trafficante v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co., the
Court interpreted the Civil Rights Act of 1968, which granted standing
to "persons aggrieved," to create a legally enforceable interest in the
"benefits from interracial associations."' 31 In Havens Realty the Court
read the same statute to confer on "all 'persons' a legal right to truthful
information about available housing."1 32
The question that access standing demands be asked in such cases
is whether the Congress intended this legislation to create a legally en-
forceable interest. If so, it has effectively announced a public value to
be given recognition in the courts. Determining whether a statute cre-
ates a legally enforceable interest bears substantial similarity to analy-
sis that now occasionally occurs under the zone of interest test, which is
considered below as an appropriate example of issue standing. 133 Yet
the aims of the two inquiries are distinct. The zone of interest test, as
described in Data Processing and its progeny, assumes the existence of
a litigant's personal stake as the result of the independent requirement
of injury in fact. Once interest has been demonstrated, therefore, it
asks whether the litigant is among the group of beneficiaries contem-
plated by the statutory or constitutional protection claimed. In a case
like Havens Realy, however, the basis for access standing itself is the
claimed violation of a right created by the statute-the right to receive
accurate information about housing. Such rights or interests provide
an appropriate basis for access to the federal judiciary regardless of
whether or not the Court terms them sources of concrete injury.
There are limits to the ability of Congress to confer federal juris-
diction. Congress could not, for example, authorize the federal courts
126. Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 514 (1975).
127. See Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman, 455 U.S. 363 (1982).
128. See Tennessee Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153 (1978) (Endangered Species Act of
1973, 16 U.S.C. § 1540(g) (1982)).
129. In Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman, 455 U.S. 363 (1978), and in Trafficante v. Metropol-
itan Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 205 (1972), the Court essentially recognized the plaintiffs' standing as
private attorneys general to enforce the Fair Housing Act of 1968, 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3619 (1976).
130. See, ag., Endangered Species Act of 1973, 16 U.S.C. § 1540(g) (1982) (granting standing
to "any person" to enforce its provisions). Such broad-based standing was not even questioned in
Tennessee Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 164 n.15 (1978).
131. 409 U.S. at 210.
132. 455 U.S. at 373.
133. See infra text accompanying notes 155-61.
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to issue advisory opinions.134 Muskrat v. United States,I3 if still good
law, indicates that Congress cannot decide the "adverseness of parties
prospectively; such determinations must be left to the courts."' 136 The
power of Congress to create interests sufficient to confer the personal
stake demanded by access standing, however, is undisputed.
3. Constitutional Interests
Although the claim is somewhat more controversial, there should
be no doubt that the Constitution, of its own force, creates legally pro-
tected interests. I believe that Justice Brennan stated the principle cor-
rectly in his dissent in Valley Forge:
When the Constitution makes it clear that a particular person is to be
protected from a particular form of government action, then that per-
son has a "right" to be free of that action; when that right is infringed,
then there is injury, and a personal stake, within the meaning of Article
111.137
The Court, however, has chosen not to take this approach. Instead, it
views some constitutional provisions as enforceable and others not. In
addition to creating a hierarchy of constitutional rights, the Court's ap-
proach has a more serious shortcoming. I have argued that the judicial
recognition of injury is a process whereby public values are given cog-
nizance in law. Thus the Court is necessarily cast in the position of
deciding, for example, that environmental harms are now sufficiently
important to trigger jurisdiction while vague fears of government sur-
veillance are not. It is difficult to understand, then, how the Justices
can decide that the interest in separation of church and state, for exam-
ple, is not a public value. That option would seem to have been fore-
closed by the adoption of the Bill of Rights. As Hamilton argued in
The Federalist No. 80, it is "obvious" that "there ought always be a
constitutional method of giving efficacy to constitutional provisions." 138
Under present standing principles, therefore, the Court has put itself in
an untenable position. Subjective and widely shared interests, such as
esthetic concerns-tied to neither constitutional nor statutory guaran-
tees-have been recognized as appropriate bases for standing. Simi-
larly, intangible and generalized statutory rights, such as concern over
the fate of endangered species, 139 have sustained jurisdiction. A deter-
134. See Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Haworth, 330 U.S. 227, 240-41 (1937); Frankfurter, Advisory
Opinions, 37 HIARv. L. REv. 1002 (1924).
135. 219 U.S. 346 (1911).
136. Tushnet, supra note 3, at 678.
137. 454 U.S. at 493 n.5 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
138. THE FEDERALIST No. 80, at 534, 535 (A. Hamilton) (J. Cooke ed. 1961).
139. See, e.g., Tennessee Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153 (1978).
[Vol. 72:68
RETHINKING STANDING
nuination that generalized constitutional claims cannot similarly sup-
port standing appears to be pure judicial fiat.
It is certainly possible that challenges to government decisions
based upon claimed infringements of constitutionally created interests
will, in various instances, run contrary to the political question doc-
trine. A plaintiff's access standing, his personal stake in the litigation,
can be created, however, by the transgression of a constitutionally pro-
tected interest. Cases like Valley Forge, Flast, Reservists, and Richard-
son, therefore, turned upon the wrong question. The Court asked
whether injuries to the rights created by the establishment clause, the
incompatibility clause, and the accounts clause respectively were dis-
tinct and palpable. It should have asked whether those clauses created
interests which could be asserted by the plaintiffs. If it had, the stand-
ing issue would have been decided differently in all three cases.
a. The Council of Revision
The claim has appeared repeatedly in decisions denying standing
based upon generalized constitutional claims that if the judiciary were
to accept such cases it would be converted into a Council of Revision, a
forum rejected by the Framers. Justice Harlan made the argument in
his dissent in IRast,' 4 and it has been repeated by Justices Powell
1 41
and Rehnquist.142 The analogy, however, is inapt.
A provision of the Virginia Plan, aggressively supported by James
Madison at the Constitutional Convention, called for the creation of a
''revisionary council" composed of the President and several members
of the Supreme Court.1 43 The Council would participate in the enact-
ing process by way of the exercise of a veto power. Should the Council
reject proposed legislation, it could become law only by means of a
legislative override. 144 One of several measures proposed to check leg-
islative prerogatives, the Council of Revision was rejected by the Fram-
ers on three separate occasions.' 45
Yet the proposed Council would have been markedly different
from even the broadest judicial review imaginable. The proponents of
revisionary power intended it to be part of the enacting process, rather
than a post-enactment review.1 46 Even more importantly, revision was
140. Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 130 (1968) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
141. United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 189-91 (1974).(Powel, J., concurring).
142. Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268, 290 n.1 (1979) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
143. 1 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 21 (May 29) (M. Farrand ed.
1911).
144. Id. at 21 (May 29), 108 (June 4), 110 (June 4), 138-39 (June 6).
145. 2 id. at 71 (July 21), 80 (July 21), 298 (Aug. 15).
146. See Berger, Standing to Sue in Public Actions: Is It a Constitutional Requirement?, 78
YALE L.J. 816, 829 n.68 (1969).
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to address itself primarily to the wisdom of legislation-not merely to
its constitutionality. 147 Opponents objected to the plan not only be-
cause it was antidemocratic but also because judges had no greater
claim to expertise on matters of general public policy than did legisla-
tors. 148 Thus, the goals of the two processes are quite distinct-even
given the breadth of modem constitutional analysis.
Finally, even when considering the propriety of such a Council,
the Framers assumed the continuing validity of judicial review. One of
the strongest objections voiced to the Council was that, having consid-
ered legislation at the revision stage, the judges would be biased in
their later, more important function of judicial review. Having partici-
pated in the formulation of the law would "give a previous tincture to
their opinions."1 49 Raoul Berger has concluded that the constitutional
debates, rather than casting doubt on broad judicial review, lead one to
the conclusion "that the founders must have welcomed any traditional
mechanism that could aid in keeping Congress within bounds."' 50
Thus, arguments for a narrowed judicial authority that are based on
the rejection of the Council of Revision should be allowed a quiet
death.
Access standing requires the demonstration of a sufficient personal
stake by the plaintiff to warrant the invocation of federal judicial
power. A plaintiff shows a personal stake, in turn, by demonstrating
harm to a legally cognizable interest. Such interests may be created or
recognized through the judicial interpretation of article III, legislative
enactments, and constitutional guarantees. Once a plaintiff shows a
personal stake, however, access standing demands no more. In a recent
strongly worded dissent, Justice Marshall claimed that once "a plaintiff
establishes a personal stake in a dispute, he has done all that is neces-
sary to 'invok[e] the court's authority . .. to challenge the action
sought to be adjudicated.' """ Justice Marshall is correct, if special
emphasis is given to the phrase "to invoke the Court's authority."
Harm to cognizable interest is the sole measure of access to the federal
judicial power. As the following sections indicate, however, plaintiffs
can also face standing hurdles once inside the courthouse.
147. 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 143, at 73-74 (July
21).
148. Id.
149. Id. at 298 (Aug. 15) (remarks of Charles Pinckney). See also WILLS, EXPLAINING
AMERICA 151-53 (1981).
150. Berger, supra note 146, at 834 (emphasis in original).
151. City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 103 S. Ct. 1660, 1679 (1983) (Marshall, J., dissenting)
(quoting Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of Church & State,




In many instances, the right to judicial access is not the end of the
standing inquiry. Standing law also demands that the plaintiff be an
appropriate party to present the legal claims upon which he relies. A
simple example demonstrates the difference between access standing
and issue standing. Suppose the state institutes a criminal prosecution
against a doctor for distributing contraceptives. He claims that the
prosecution is unconstitutional because it violates the privacy rights of
his patients. The question arises, therefore, whether the doctor may
assert as his defense the constitutional protections of third parties. Ac-
cess standing is, of course, clear. The doctor's liberty is at stake-
thereby satisfying article III. Issue standing, however, asks not whether
a litigant may invoke federal jurisdiction, but whether he is an appro-
priate party to present the constitutional claim. Emphasis is no longer
on the plaintiffs personal stake in the controversy, but on the litigant's
relationship to the legal claims he presents. Another example is City of
Los Angeles v. Lyons. In this case the Court assumed the plaintiff had
standing to present a damages claim arising from allegations of police
brutality, but denied him standing to seek injunctive relief.152 I think
the Lyons outcome was wrong.15 3 Still, it correctly states the principle
that a plaintiff must have standing to present the particular legal issues
raised.
Issue standing asks, in short, whether the plaintiffs legal claims
are his to raise. Still, the inquiry into the legal issues raised centers on
protective intent, not only the likelihood of recovery or the suitability
of the issues for judicial determination.'54 Of all analysis that takes
place under the rubric "standing," issue standing is the least related to
the measurement of judicial power. It does not ask whether the claim
is justiciable or whether the plaintiff may properly invoke federal juris-
diction. Rather than measuring article III powers, it focuses instead on
the breadth and intent of substantive law. Accordingly, its principles
are appropriately malleable so as to meet the ends of various substan-
tive legal protections.
1. Zones of Interest
Since announced in Data Processing, 155 the zone of interest test
152. City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 103 S. Ct. 1660 (1983).
153. See infra text accompanying notes 182-86.
154. See Scott, supra note 3, at 684.
155. 397 U.S. 150, 153 (1970). The test demands that the "interest sought to be protected by
the complainant is arguably within the zone of interests to be protected or regulated by the statute
or constitutional guarantee in question."
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has been virtually ignored. 156 Yet the test serves several useful func-
tions. Statutes and even constitutional provisions 157 are sometimes
designed to benefit a particular class.1 58 By demanding that the plain-
tiff be from the protected class, standing law helps to measure the ap-
propriate contours of the protections afforded. It also places control of
the legal situation in the hands of those whom Congress considered
most immediately concerned.159
The zone of interest test can also supply a necessary bridge be-
tween the interests asserted to achieve standing and the claim on the
merits. In this context, it could be recast as a demand for a nexus160
156. See, e.g., K. DAViS, supra note 3, § 22.02-11.
157. In Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Enytl. Study Group, Inc., 438 U.S. 59 (1978), for exam-
ple, a substantial question was presented as to whether the constitutional claim upon which the
plaintiffs relied (the due process clause) was designed to protect against the injuries asserted (envi-
ronmental harms). The Court, however, ignored the issue. See infra note 160.
158. The zone of interest test has meaningful application only when access standing is based
upon injury in fact as opposed to harm to constitutional or statutorily-created interests. If access
standing is premised upon the denial of a statutory or constitutional interest, zone of interest
analysis is essentially redundant.
For cases recognizing that statutes and regulations are often designed to protect a limited
class, see, for example, Moore v. Tangipahoa Parish School Bd., 625 F.2d 33 (5th Cir. 1980);
Committee for Auto Responsibility (C.A.R.) v. Solomon, 603 F.2d 992 (D.C. Cir. 1979), cert.
denied, 445 U.S. 915 (1980); In re Swearingen Aviation Corp., 605 F.2d 125 (4th Cir. 1979); Circle
Lounge & Grille, Inc. v. Board of Appeal, 324 Mass. 427, 86 N.E.2d 920 (1949).
159. Jaffe, Standing Again, 84 HARV. L. Rav. 633, 637 (1971) ("If the interests which the law
chooses to protect are satisfied with the status quo though it may involve an alleged violation, why
should a stranger have a right to insist on enforcement?").
160. See, ag., Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614 (1973). Such a nexus requirement was
rejected by the Supreme Court in Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Envtl. Study Group, Inc., 438 U.S.
59 (1978). There, environmentalists challenged the Atomic Energy Damages Act of 1957, which
limits liability in the event of nuclear plant disaster. Pub. L. No. 85-256, § 4, 71 Stat. 576, 576-79
(1957) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2210 (1976)). The plaintiffs claimed the limitation
violated the due process clause by unreasonably limiting recovery. They claimed two sets of dam-
ages: (1) the existing environmental harms associated with the mere operation of the plant; and
(2) the injuries related to the claim-potential lost recovery if a disaster occurred. Because the
Court considered the latter damages speculative, standing was granted only on the basis of the
existing environmental harms. The defendants thus claimed that there was no relationship be-
tween the injuries asserted for purposes of standing, and the claim on the merits.
Chief Justice Burger's opinion for the Court refused to "extend" the nexus requirement out of
the taxpayer context. 438 U.S. at 79; see Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 (1968). The Court also
ignored the zone of interest test which, I think, the plaintiffs would have failed if standing had
been based only on the existing harms. Certainly, however, Justice Stewart was correct when he
declared in his concurring opinion in Duke Power: "Surely there must be some direct relationship
between the plaintiffs federal claim and the injuries relied on for standing." 438 U.S. at 95 (Stew-
art, J., concurring in the result) (emphasis in original).
Duke Power is so riddled with holes that it should perhaps simply be totally ignored as a
standing case. See Nichol, Causation, supra note 3, at 207-08. By refusing to apply a nexus or
zone of interest analysis the Court successfully avoided the tough issue in the case-whether the
potential losses over and above the limitation of liability were too speculative to support judicial
review.
The language, if not the analysis, of the nexus requirement reappeared in Leeke v. Timmer-
man, 454 U.S. 83 (1981). There a suit against state prison officials was dismissed because there
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between the injuries alleged and the substantive claims presented. A
nexus requirement, however, is merely another way of asking whether
the legal provision on which the plaintiff bases a claim is intended to
protect one in the plaintiff's position. Absent some demonstrable link
between the injury sustained and the cause of action, the standing re-
quirement becomes artificial. Injury, which is dispositive of a party's
access to the federal courthouse, becomes irrelevant to the determina-
tion of the claim on the merits. Thus, the zone of interest test can be
used both to define the scope of substantive protections and to ensure
an appropriate relation between the federal cause of action and the ba-
sis for access standing.
2. Third Party Standing
It has been held that a plaintiff must assert his own legal interests
rather than those of third parties. 61 Yet the third party standing rule is
not grounded in article III. The plaintiff still must independently
demonstrate injury in fact,1 62 redressability, and causation. Rather, the
standard seeks "to limit access to the federal courts to those litigants
best suited to assert a particular claim." 1 63
In reality, therefore, the Court, rather than attempting to measure
judicial authority, designs third party rules to improve decisionmaking
by ensuring the best plaintiffs and promoting the "liberal value of self-
determination."'164 Consider, for example, Gilmore v. Utah.'65 There,
Gary Gilmore's mother was effectively denied standing to mount a
challenge to the execution of her son. Gilmore himself had refused to
appeal. Clearly the rationale for the decision could not have been that
she had no "stake" in the dispute. The injuries she sustained as the
result of her son's death would more than meet the dictates of article
III. Principles of third party standing prevented the dispute from being
litigated by a "stranger" to the transaction and left the decision con-
cerning appeal in Gilmore's hands.
Exceptions to the third party bar serve essentially substantive con-
cerns. Courts have often allowed the presentation of the rights of
others where it would be difficult for the persons whose rights were
was a "questionable nexus between respondent's injury.. . and the challenged actions of the
state officials."
161. C. WRIoHT, supra note 16, § 13, at 71-72. See Tileston v. Ullman, 318 U.S. 44 (1943);
Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163 (1972).
162. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, Inc. v. City of Akron, 651 F.2d 1198, 1210-11
(6th Cir. 1981), rev'd in part on other grounds, 103 S. Ct. 2481 (1983).
163. Gladstone, Realtors v. Village of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91, 100 (1979).
164. Brilmayer, supra note 3, at 310.
165. 429 U.S. 1012 (1976).
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asserted to present those grievances before any court. 6 6 In such cir-
cumstances, there are few reasons for deferring to the silence of the
right-holder. Nor, obviously, is the Court apt to obtain a "better plain-
tiff." In addition, the Court has allowed plaintiffs to assert the rights of
third parties in challenges for overbreadth and vagueness in order to
ensure more stringent protection of various constitutional
guarantees. 167
My goal here has obviously been something less than providing a
full examination and critique of zone of interest and third party stand-
ing analysis. Rather, this brief discussion of the two standards has been
designed to demonstrate that the methods and goals of issue standing
are quite distinct from the core of standing analysis discussed previ-
ously as access standing. The two share common ground in that both
question whether the litigant is a proper party. Access standing de-
mands that the plaintiff be an appropriate party to invoke the judicial
power. Issue standing, on the other hand, demands that a litigant be a
proper party to raise particular legal claims. In a substantial sense,
therefore, issue standing more closely approximates a decision on the
merits--even if ultimately only a decision that a particular constitu-
tional or statutory provision does not protect the plaintiff. It provides,
in essence, an adjudication of the scope and severability of a legal guar-
antee.'6 8 Unlike a denial of access standing, it is not simply a refusal to
decide. And unlike access standing, issue standing does not involve
questions of the appropriate scope of judicial authority. More accu-
rately, issue standing governs the judiciary's principled disposition of
its business.
C. Decision Standing-The Political Question Doctrine
Chief Justice Warren wrote in Flast that "when standing is placed
in issue in a case, the question is whether the person whose standing is
challenged is a proper party to request an adjudication of a particular
issue and not whether the issue itself is justiciable."' 169 The group of
cases that I will discuss as examples of "decision standing" violate this
166. See, eg., NAACP v. Alabamaexrel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449 (1958); Barrows v. Jackson,
346 U.S. 249 (1953). The rule has been relaxed over the past decade. See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S.
190 (1976); Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106 (1976).
167. The Court will, for example, entertain overbreadth challenges to a statute if the statute
regulates pure speech. Schad v. Borough of Mt. Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61 (1981). Such challenges
have been rejected, however, if the statute primarily regulates conduct, even if the first amend-
ment may protect some actions regulated by the statute. See, eg., Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413
U.S. 601 (1973). The distinction is obviously one of substantive free expression law, not case or
controversy analysis.
168. See Scott, supra note 3, at 686 n.160.
169. 392 U.S. at 99-100.
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"fundamental aspect" ' ° of standing analysis. The Court has, on occa-
sion, denied standing because resolving the controversy or providing
the remedy in question is the responsibility of another branch of gov-
ernment. Thus, the standing determination turns on the justiciability
of the claim rather than on whether the plaintiff is a proper party.
Examples of such blending of standing and political question anal-
yses abound. In Laird v. Tatum I7 the Court dismissed a challenge to
the operation of a domestic Army intelligence gathering system for
want of concrete harm. The refusal to acknowledge injury was due in
part to the Court's fear that such cases "would have the federal courts
as virtually continuing monitors of the wisdom and soundness of Exec-
utive action."' 72 The Court refused to recognize injury based on con-
stitutional interests in Reservists 73 and Richardson 174 because to do so
would purportedly have led to "'government by injunction' "175 or
transformed our governmental structure into "an Athenian democracy
or a New England town meeting to oversee the conduct of the National
Government by means of lawsuits in federal courts."'176 To have recog-
nized standing based upon the establishment clause, the Valley Forge
Court asserted, would have altered "relationships between the coequal
arms of the National Government."1 77
The Supreme Court has not limited decision standing to those sit-
uations raising separation of powers concerns at the national level. In
Rizzo v. Goode 178 past victims of alleged widespread unconstitutional
police conduct aimed at minority citizens could not obtain prospective
relief because they lacked "the requisite 'personal stake in the out-
come."' The Court's negative ruling on injury, however, apparently
reflected its broader belief that the plaintiffs sought an "unwarranted
intrusion by the federal judiciary into the discretionary authority" com-
mitted to local and state officials. 17 9 O'Shea v. Littleton reflects a simi-
lar theory. 180
The use of decision standing is troubling on a number of fronts. It
introduces factors into the standing calculus beyond the scope of the
doctrine. Further, decision standing employs particularized injury as a
170. Id. at 99.
171. 408 U.S. 1 (1972).
172. Id. at 15.
173. Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208 (1974).
174. United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166 (1974).
175. Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208, 222 (1974).
176. United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 179 (1974).
177. 454 U.S. at 473.
178. 423 U.S. 362, 372-73 (1976) (quoting Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204 (1962)).
179. Id. at 366.
180. 414 U.S. 488, 500 (1974) (characterizing the suit as a request for "an ongoing federal
audit of state criminal proceedings").
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surrogate for direct examination of the appropriate role of the judiciary
in our system of government. The injury standard, however, performs
that function quite poorly. As a result, the Court has not only failed to
face federalism and separation of powers concerns head on, it has
manipulated the injury standard in the process.
Constitutionally based actions can indeed threaten undue judicial
intrusion into the workings of other branches of government. Intrusive
cases, however, fall on either side of the particularized harm standard.
Valley Forge and Reservists, in which there was no particularized in-
jury, posed no separation of powers problems. Both cases called for
interpretation of constitutional guarantees, but neither would have re-
sulted in judicial intrusion into the workings of another branch of gov-
ernment. On the other hand, cases such as Davis v. Passman indicate
that separation of powers problems can be as readily presented by
claims in which particularized injury is clear.181 City of Los Angeles v.
Lyons1s2 is a striking example of how the Court distorts the injury re-
quirement in order to serve the ends of decision standing,-in this in-
stance the pursuit of federalism. The Lyons plaintiff, the choke-hold
victim, sought not only damages but also an injunction against the fu-
ture use of the hold except in response to deadly force. The Court de-
nied the victim standing to seek injunctive relief since it deemed the
possibility that Lyons would again be the victim of a choke hold specu-
lative. Writing for the Court, Justice White declared that in order to
establish injury "Lyons would have had not only to allege that he
would have another encounter with the police but also to make the
incredible assertion .. that all police officers in Los Angeles always
choke any citizen with whom they happen to have an encounter."l. 3
Lyons reflects an extraordinary treatment of injury. Under the
Court's analysis, standing law effectively demands certain proof that an
actual strangling will occur in order to invoke federal jurisdiction. It is
inconceivable, however, given the interests recognized under the injury
standard in past decisions, that Lyons asserted no particularized harm.
The record reflected that the police after stopping Lyons for a burned
out taillight, rendered him unconscious by a choke hold. He awoke
lying "on the ground, choking, gasping for air, and spitting up blood
and dirt. He had urinated and defecated."' 8 4 Any person having sur-
vived Lyons' trauma would no doubt live in considerable fear of a re-
peat performance so long as the contested practices remained in
181. 442 U.S. 228 (1979). In Davis an administrative assistant was allowed to sue her em-
ployer, a United States Congressman, for sex discrimination. Davis certainly presents a greater
threat to the workings of another branch of government than did Valley Forge.
182. 103 S. Ct. 1660 (1983).
183. Id. at 1667.
184. Id. at 1672 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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operation. That fear, even if Lyons was never spoken to by another
policeman, is more concrete, more particularized and more substantial
than the bulk of injuries recognized in modem standing decisions.
The key to understanding Lyons lies in the Court's declaration
that such grievances are addressed more appropriately to "local author-
ities." 185 Consider, however, the results of infusing federalism concerns
into the standing calculus. If deference to local government is the basis
for Lyons, the Court failed to explain the rationale for such deference.
Instead, the Court purportedly dismissed the claim for injunctive relief
because of an absence of injury. If, on the other hand, we are to take
the treatment of injury at face value, how are "liberal" injury cases like
SCRAP and Havens Realy to be understood?
This tendency to skew the standing inquiry with justiciability con-
cers-which I have called decision standing-should be abandoned.
In such cases, principled analysis would be served better by addressing
federalism and separation of powers concerns directly instead of con-
tinuing to manipulate the injury standard.18 6 The political question
doctrine should, therefore, be given more teeth and, if necessary, be
expanded to include federalism analysis. Concern for the justiciability
of the issue presented by the plaintiff, however, should be removed
from the standing calculus.
CONCLUSION
Standing law, like the proverbial politician, speaks out of both
sides of its mouth. On the one hand, in order to segregate the standing
inquiry from consideration of the claim on the merits and general jus-
ticiability concerns, the entire doctrine has been founded upon an over-
arching principle-particularized harm. In the years since the
adoption of the injury standard, however, the Supreme Court has used
the standing doctrine to accomplish far more than the mere determina-
tion that the plaintiff is an appropriate party to invoke federal jurisdic-
tion. The Court has also employed standing law to measure the
appropriate scope of judicial authority and to mitigate federal judicial
interference with local concerns. As a result, in the process of defining
actionable injury, the Court has reinserted the very factors into the
standing calculus which the particularized harm standard was designed
to remove. Further, federalism and separation of powers issues have
generally been concealed behind a standing discussion concerning the
directness of injury or the generalized nature of the claim. The result
185. Id. at 1670.
186. See Scott, supra note 3, at 686; Tushnet, The Sociology of Article IL" A Response to
Professor Brilmayer, 93 HIv. L. Rnv. 1698, 1726 (1980).
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has not been beneficial to either standing law or the analysis of the
appropriate role of the judiciary in our system of government.
I have argued that standing analysis would be better served if the
Court were to separate the various issues reflected in its case or contro-
versy decisions and address them openly and independently. The core
of standing is, of course, whether the plaintiff has shown sufficient in-
terest to obtain access to federal judicial power. Yet access standing
should require no more than that a litigant assert injury to an interest
arguably cognizable by law. Issue standing, on the other hand, should
be focused primarily on the breadth of protections offered by various
substantive guarantees. As a result, its standards may be tailored ap-
propriately to meet the ends of various substantive principles-ex-
tending, for example, overbreadth analysis when free expression rights
are at stake but contracting the doctrine in privacy cases. 187 Finally,
decision standing, pursuant to which the Court has denied standing
based upon the justiciability of the claim, should be abandoned. Mea-
suring the proper expanse of judicial authority vis-a-vis other institu-
tions of government should be accomplished under the political
question doctrine. So envisioned, the standing doctrine would likely
prove a less formidable obstacle to the acquisition of federal jurisdic-
tion. If it is true, as I have argued, that the standing principle has been
made to carry the baggage of other concerns, it should not be surprising
that a "cleaning" of the doctrine would result in a lowered access
threshold.
Standing law, as presently constructed, is so unfocused that it
seems to serve no useful or at least no ascertainable ends. That will
likely remain the case so long as standing determinations appear. to
take into account first one set of interests and then another, but all the
while employ conclusory declarations concerning the nature of injury
as the basis for decision. As Lincoln argued, "[I]f we could first know
where we are and whither we are tending, we could better judge what to
do, and how to do it."'"8 Recognizing the complexity of the injury de-
termination and segregating the numerous interests that have affected
past standing decisions are essential first steps in learning where we are,
and even perhaps "whither we are tending" in case or controversy anal-
ysis. Without such preliminaries, however, we stand little chance of
knowing what to do, and how to do it.
187. See, eg., H.L. v. Matheson, 450 U.S. 398, 405-06 (1981).
188. A. Lincoln, Acceptance Speech to the Republican Convention (June 16, 1858), in ABRA-
HAM LINCOLN: His SPEECHES AND WRmTNrs 372 (R. Bosler ed. 1946).
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